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Article 6

ENTRAPMENT: SORRELLS TO RUSSELL
I. Introduction
Richard Russell was found guilty by a jury in the United States District
Court in the state of Washington on three counts of having unlawfully manu-

factured and processed methamphetamine and of having unlawfully sold and
delivered that drug in violation of a federal statute. Russell based his defense
on entrapment: a federal agent induced him into perpetrating the offense by
supplying him with an essential, though not illegal, ingredient in the manufacturing of the drug. After consideration of Russell's appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, concluding as a matter
of law that a "defense to a criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable
degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise,"' regardless of
whether or not the accused had the predisposition to commit the crime. The
United States Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari and reversed the court of appeals. The Court held in United States V.
Russell that it is only when the Government's deception actually implants the
criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment
comes into play.2
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Russell has added some
clarity to the furthering development of the defense of entrapment, but many
areas still need to have attention focused upon them. Those utilizing the defense
will still search for adequate guidelines upon which to base their entrapment
strategy. It is for the purpose of clarifying what the Supreme Court said and
what it did not say in Russell, with regard to entrapment, that this note is written.
The consideration of the defense of entrapment was late in appearing within
the American criminal justice system. In 1864 a judge was prompted to remark
that "this plea has never... availed to shield crime... and it is safe to say that
it never will." 3 This extreme position began to deteriorate shortly thereafter. In
1878" the defense of entrapment was given consideration for the first time by a
federal court;5 it was not until 1915, thirty-seven years later,' that a federal court
gave successful recognition to the doctrine.7 The United States Supreme Court
first applied' it in Sorrells v. United States.' Prior to Sorrells, Supreme Court
consideration of the defense had occurred in two cases:'" Casey v. United State'
and Grimm v. United States.' In each instance, however, the Court failed to
find government inducement.
For practical purposes, the courts have attempted to break down the
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United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Board of Comm'rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878).
Note, Entrapment,45 TExAs L. Rav. 578, 579 (1967).
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
Note, supra note 5, at 579.
Id.
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Note, supra note 5, at 579.
276 U.S. 413 (1928).
156 U.S. 604 (1895).
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defense into four distinct elements.'" The four essentials of the defense are:
(1) a governmental instigation resulting in the commission of a crime, (2)
actual inducements by government agents, (3) establishment of causation between the government's inducements and the defendant's actions, and (4) lack
of criminal design by the defendant with regard to commission of the instant
crime. 4 As will be seen, however, it is much easier to categorize the defense than
it is to apply it.
The Supreme Court prior to Russell failed to adequately define the scope
of its application. Consequently the lower courts were confused concerning
proper instructions for the jury. 5 Before the Russell case, the Supreme Court
last examined- the doctrine in Lopez v. United States, " but failed to establish any
consistent guidelines for the lower courts in the application of the defense. 17 As
evidence of this problem, various justifications for the defense arouse:' s estoppel
as a result of government misconduct, 9 due process,"0 and judicial and public
policy considerations. 2 In order to clarify the defense, then, the Court decided
to accept the Government's petition in Russell for a writ of certiorari.
II. Functional Approaches: innocence v. Objective
In first giving recognition to entrapment in Sorrells, the Supreme Court
failed to prescribe adequate guidelines for establishing the predisposition of the
defendant; furthermore, it made no attempt to determine guiding criteria for the
amount of inducement which would be permissible.22 As a result the lower
courts have been applying the defense of entrapment in relation to the differing
approaches. The majority approach was the innocence approach-there must
be no predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.2" The
majority requires that all four components of the defense be established for it to be
successful.24 The minority followed the objective approach-police misconduct
is the only real issue. 5 To the minority, the fourth component is unimportant;
what is important, however, is the conduct of the police.
The decision in Russell reflects the continuing struggle between the proponents of these two concepts. The court of appeals, in reversing the district
court conviction, held that whenever the court determines that there has been
13 E.g., State v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 297, 413 P.2d 764 (1966).
14 Many courts summarily refer to the four elements of the defense as the accused's predisposition.
15 Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DuK. L.J. 39, 43.
16 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
18 As subsequently explained, the justifications derive from three broad areas: constitutional, legislative, and policy considerations.
19 E.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
20 E.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
21 E.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurring opinion).
22 Note, Entrapment: An Analysis of Disagreement, 45 B.U. L. Rv. 542, 552 (1965).
23 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932).
24 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-75 (1958); Hastings v. Thurston, 100
Ariz. 297, 413 P.2d 764, 766 (1966).
25 The proposed new FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971), Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, § 702, and the American Law Institute's MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), recommend adoption of the objective
approach.
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"an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise,
the criminal prosecution must be dismissed" 2-- application by the appeals
court of the objective theory.
The application of the objective approach by the appeals court was based
on alternative theories."7 The first theory, ignoring the accused's predisposition
altogether, is based upon lower court decisions that sustain entrapment whenever the government has supplied the defendant with contraband. 8 The second
theory, based upon a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit,29 allows the defense
whenever the government is overly active in the criminal enterprise. Both
theories were based upon considerations for due process.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in reversing the court of appeals, reaffirmed the
Sorrells majority and the innocence approach.3 0 Justice Rehnquist asserted that
the successful reliance upon the defense must relate to the finding that the accused had no prior intent to commit the instant crime."' He held that it is "only
when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the
mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play." 2 The
entrapment defense, then, is available only to those who would not have committed the crime but for the inducements of the Government. Thus, the innocence
approach is concerned with the overall make-up of the accused in each case; if
he did not have the predisposition to commit the crime and the criminal enterprise was not attributable to him, then entrapment is a successful defense to government inducement. 8 If these elements are present, and the accused consequently commits a crime due to governmental instigation, the Government will
not be successful in its prosecution.
Not all are in agreement, however, with the innocence approach and with
Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A sharply divided Court 4 indicates the continuing controversy over the issue. Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent, 5 which was joined by Mr.
Justice Brennan, stated that his view concurred with Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent in Casey v.United States;"8 with Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Sherman v. United States;3- and with Mr. Justice Roberts, concurring in Sorrells
26
27

459 F.2d at 673.
411 U.S. at 427.

28 E.g., United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). See note 40 infra drawing
the distinction between the supplying of legal and illegal material by the government agent.
29 Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). In Greene, the defendants had
the predisposition to commit the crime (the manufacturing and selling of illegal whiskey), but
the convictions were still reversed. The factors that the Court considered in reversing the conviction were (1) who initiated the contact between the agent and the defendant; (2) what
was the time period of the agent-defendant relationship; (3) what was the nature of the role
of the agent; and (4) who were the defendant's customers aside from the Government. In so

considering these elements, the Court realized that the defense was genuinely distinct from

entrapment because the predisposition to commit the crime was present.
30 411 U.S. at 436. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist said, "The Court of Appeals was wrong, we
believe, when it sought to broaden the principle laid down in Sorrells and Sherman."

31 Id. at 429.
32 Id. at 436.
33 287 U.S. at 451.

34 The district court conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court on a five-to-four division,
with Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dissenting.

35

411 U.S. at 436.
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276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928).

37

356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958).
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5 Those opinions all expressed
v. United States."
the objective approach to entrapment with its emphasis upon police misconduct. As Mr. Justice Roberts said in
Sorrells:

The applicable principle is that courts must be dosed to the trial of a crime
instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no comparison of
equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place
in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.3 9
Mr. Justice Douglas obviously felt that the governmental participation in Rus-

sell exceeded the bounds of proper police conduct."
Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall joined, also disagreed with Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Mr. Justice Stewart
asserted that the question was not one of the accused's predisposition, but rather
one of the government's instigation.41
However, as evidenced by Mr. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, the
innocence approach is now the prevailing view. The defense is successful only
if the criminal act comes as a result of the creative activity of the government's
agents.4" As a result of the Court's decision in Russell, the courts, when the defense of entrapment is raised, must make two basic inquiries: did the government official induce the commission of the crime, and if so, was the accused predisposed to commit the crime regardless of the governmental inducement? 3 If
the former element is present, but the latter is not, then the defense of entrapment
38

287 U.S. at 453.

39 Id. at 459.
40 It is interesting to note that in the cases cited by Mr. Justice Douglas, the Government
had supplied the defendants with illegal contraband. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); and United States v.
Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). In citing the Chisum case, Mr. Justice Douglas
referred to Judge Ferguson's conclusion: "When the government supplies the contraband, the
receipt of which is illegal, the government cannot be permitted to punish the one receiving it."
411 U.S. at 438. However, Mr. Justice Douglas failed to note the fact that in the Russell case,
the material given by the Government agent to the defendant was not illegal.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dealt with this issue in his majority opinion, noting that:
Shapiro's contribution of propanone to the criminal enterprise already in process
was scarcely objectionable. The chemical is by itself a harmless substance and its
possession is legal. While the Government may have been seeking to make it more
difficult for drug rings, such as that of which respondent was a member, to obtain
the chemical, the evidence ... shows that it nonetheless was obtainable.
411 U.S. at 432. Justice Rehnquist, then, implicitly disallowed the defense of entrapment
unless the material supplied was illegal or near impossible to obtain.
Mr. Justice Stewart, however, clarified how difficult it was to obtain the chemical supplied by the Government. As he explained ". . . the chemical ingredient was available only
to licensed persons, and the Government itself had requested suppliers not to sell that ingredient even to people with a license." 411 U.S. at 449. So it appears, then, that this
particular chemical, though not illegal to possess, was all but impossible to obtain.
It may be that Russell will ultimately be distinguished on the grounds that when the
Government agents supply an ingredient which is illegal or which is completely unobtainable,
this will constitute entrapment by law, for as Mr. Justice Stewart said, "It cannot be doubted
that if phenyl-2-propanone had been unobtainable from other sources, the agent's undercover
offer . . . would be precisely the type of governmental conduct that constitutes entrapment
under any definition." 411 U.S. at 448. But, if the material supplied is not illegal, even
though it is extremely difficult to obtain, the innocence test will then have to be applied to
determine if the defense of entrapment can be sustained.
41 411 U.S. at 441.
42 287 U.S. at 451.
43 Note, The Defense of Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1333, 1335 (1960).
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will be sustained. Any other combination of these elements will result in failure
of the defense.
III. Functional Problems
The innocence approach has major functional disadvantages that the
majority opinion in Russell failed to consider. One of the functional problems,
alluded to earlier, is determining the criteria by which the accused's "predisposition" is measured. In United States v. Sherman, Judge Learned Hand stipulated
burden of proof requirements that the defense and prosecution had to meet. In
raising the defense, the accused must show there was governmental inducement;
once inducement is shown, the prosecution must produce evidence indicating
that regardless of inducement, the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime.44 The prosecution has three methods of proving predisposition: (1)
evidence indicating that the accused has perpetrated similar crimes in the past;
(2) direct proof that the accused was already predisposed to commit the crime
of which he stands charged; and (3) ready testimony that the defendant was
anything but reluctant to participate in the government's offer of criminal
activity."5 These methods, however, have failed to provide the consistent results
which the courts have been seeking.4" The majority in Russell failed to establish
new guidelines, and therefore the lower courts must still attempt to work within the
confusing and obscure distinctions of Sorrells and Sherman.
The prosecution, in attempting to place the defendant within one of these
categories, is permitted to produce direct and hearsay evidence concerning the
accused's criminal history (criminal activity for which he was convicted and for
which he was not convicted) and general character. 7 For the most part, courts
have been willing recipients of evidence concerning criminal activity which is
either unrelated in nature to the instant crime or quite remote in time.4" Mr.
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Russell, warned of the consequences of this evidence
in that it is unreliable as well as prejudicial.4 Mr. Justice Rehnquist's silence on
this point could be interpreted as tacit approval.
The second functional flaw is now apparent-in admitting the direct and
hearsay evidence concerning the accused and his prior activity into the court
proceedings, the jury may have an extremely difficult task in considering this
evidence solely in relation to the entrapment issue of predisposition. The jury
may be prejudiced toward the accused when it must then decide the substantive
charges against him in supposed ignorance of the hearsay evidence.5" To a great
degree, this does not provide adequate protection to the accused because the jury
may often decide the case by comparing police instigation against the defendant's
prior activities which have been admitted into evidence through relaxation of
44
45
46

60

200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952).
United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d 'Cir. 1933).
Donnelly, judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,

YALM

47
48
49
50

L.J. 1091, 1104 (1951).

Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948).
Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1954).
411 U.S. at 443.
Note, supra note 22, at 556.
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evidentiary requirements; therefore, the more suspect the accused's past, the
greater is the inducement which the police can safely utilize."1 As such, it is conceivable that if two suspects are induced to commit the same crime under similar
circumstances, one will go free because he was entrapped and the other will go
to jail because of prior activities that have no relationship whatsoever to the
instant crime.52
A third functional area with which the majority in Russell failed to concern
itself in considering the defense of entrapment involves the question of whether
the police must have probable cause or reasonable suspicion in order to commence inducement, " and if so, the related question of whether prior judicial
involvement will be required to see that those standards have been met.54
The federal courts have not generally insisted upon probable cause before
initiating inducement.5 Some hold that it is not a condition precedent to inducement,56 while others indicate that where there is evidence presented by the
accused that indicates governmental inducement, the burden is then shifted to
the police to prove that they had reasonable cause to suspect the defendant.
It has also been held that prior suspicion need not be harbored by the police
before initiating inducement.58 In routine police undercover work where they
merely offer the defendant an "opportunity" to commit the crime, e.g., the sale
of illegal drugs, the courts for the most part do not require the police to have
prior suspicions. 9
When probable cause has been held to be a prerequisite to inducement,
rumors, complaints, and suspicions have been held to be admissible to establish
this requirement.6 1 The evidence to establish probable cause for inducement is
not to be considered by the jury as tending to establish the guilt of the accused
to commit that specific crime, but rather only to justify governmental inducement. However,
such information may adversely affect the jury's attitude toward
61
the defendant.

As indicated, the courts are not in complete agreement as to what constitutes "probable cause" and whether probable cause is necessary to initiate
inducement. The majority in Russell did not enlighten the lower courts on
this matter. They will no doubt continue to be inconsistent in their application
of this requirement.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 557.
53 The general view seems to be that if the government had reasonable suspicion before
inducement, its activities will be upheld. E.g., Rylves v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945
(10th Cir. 1950).

54 Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement:Lewis v. United States and
Beyond, 4 Hous. L. REv. 609, 617 (1967).
55 The courts have made a distinction in this area between reasonable cause and probable
cause. Generally, reasonable cause is analogous to reasonable suspicion. Reasonable cause
requirements are less demanding than the requirements of probable cause.
56 See Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1954).
57 See, e.g., Rylves v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 1950).
58 E.g., Swallum v. United States, 39 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1930).
59 Note, supra note 22, at 555.
60 Id. at 554-55.
61 At this stage in the trial, hearsay evidence may be extremely damaging. Not only will
the jury use this evidence to determine probable cause, but it can also reflect upon it when
determining the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime and then reconsider it once
again when deciding the substantial charges against the accused.
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If in the future the Supreme Court reaches the issue of probable cause, the
question of whether or not prior judicial involvement will be necessary before
inducement can be initiated will be an important question."2 Proponents of
individual rights will argue that the "right to privacy" can only be protected
from the police in this area by prior judicial involvement. '3 Possibly, a "warrant
to encourage" may be required before the police can initiate the process." The
technical difficulties in obtaining such a warrant are minimal. For example, in
Russell the defendants were under suspicion for months; there was certainly
sufficient time for the government to submit its evidence to a judicial officer before any further inducements were offered. With that requirement, individual
rights would be more adequately protected.
The courts are divided upon the functional test to be applied-whether
it is based upon the innocence or objective approach and the requisite conduct
necessary for inducement to be initiated. However, the courts have also found
themselves divided over the theoretical basis for the defense, i.e., where the
defendant legally obtains the right to even raise the defense.
IV. Theoretical Basis
There appear to be three basic areas of theoretical justification for the defendant's right to raise the defense: (1) legislative policy, (2) judicial policy, or
(3) constitutional requirements. The majority in Sorrells favored legislative
policy, basing their view on the presumption that Congress meant that criminal
statutes are violated only when individuals act of their own will. As the majority
stated:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part
innocent" in order to lure them to its commission and
of persons "otherwise
5
to punish them.
In Russell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist also based the defense upon congressional
intent in asserting that it is not the role of the courts to dismiss prosecutions for
what it considers to be overinvolvement by government agents in the criminal
enterprise.66 Rather, the Justice felt that it was not the intent of Congress to
otherwise would not have comhave individuals prosecuted for crimes that they
67
mitted but for the governmental inducement.
62 As the situation now exists, the wrongs that are committed in the process of "entrapping" the accused cannot be rectified until late in the trial stage due to the lack of prior
judicial involvement and the failure of the courts to stipulate proper police conduct for inducement.
63 That there is a constitutional right of privacy against certain types of governmental

intrusions is now no longer a matter of dispute. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

64 Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practiceof Encouragement: Lewis v. United States and
Beyond, 4 Hous. L. Rtv. 609, 620 (1967).

65 287 U.S. at 448.
66 411 U.S. at 435.
67 Id.
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The minority in Sorrells and in Russell disagreed with Mr. Justice Rehnquist. As Mr. Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Sorrells stated:
A new method of rationalizing the defense is now asserted. This is to
construe the act creating the offense by reading in a condition or proviso
that if the offender shall have been entrapped into crime the law shall
not apply to him. So, it is said, the true intent of the legislature will be
effectuated. This seems a strained and unwarranted construction of the
statute; and amounts, in fact, to judicial amendment. It is not merely broad
construction, but addition of an element not contained in the legislation.""
In particular, he could find no guideline as to when a particular statute should
preclude the defense. 9
Aside from Mr. Justice Roberts's criticism, the legislative theory has been
criticized by proponents of the objective approach on one major ground: by
basing the defense on legislative intent, Congress is being invested with the
power to control the defense. ° Although not admitting such, Mr. Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, for different reasons, may have been more concerned with
congressional control than with theoretical arguments about the basis of the
defense.
As indicated above, Mr. Justice Roberts was opposed to the legislative
policy basis for the defense. He maintained that judicial policy was the basis of
the defense. Justice Roberts believed that it was the Court's duty to check the
cleanliness of the government's hands. As he said:
The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy. The
protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own
temple belong only to the court. It is the province of the court and of the
itself and the government from such prostitution of
court alone to protect
71
the criminal law.

Continuing this theme in Russell, Mr. Justice Stewart, quoting Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Casey v. United States,72 said that: "'This prosecution should be
stopped, not because some right of Casey's has been denied, but in order to
protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To
preserve the purity of its courts.' "'I
Mr. Justice Roberts's reasoning also includes one major weakness. In
entrapment controversies, what is at issue is not the admittance or rejection of
evidence by a judge, but the power to completely release a defendant who has,
technically at least, committed a crime. 4 Such power to pardon has been held
68

287 U.S. at 455-56.

69

Id. at 455. 'Certain mala in se crimes have been held not to allow the defense of entrap-

70

Comment, Entrapment: Instigation Not Investigation, 26 LA. L. REv. 848, 850 (1966).

ment. Roberts feared that this policy would be blurred if the majority's theoretical basis was
adopted.
71 287 U.S. at 457.
72 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928).
73 411 U.S. at 442-43.
74 It is not completely clear that an entrapped individual has willfully and intentionally
committed a crime.
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by the Court to belong only to the executive." What the proponents of the
objective approach may be attempting to deny to Congress-control over entrapment-may also be outside the province of the judiciary.
The third possible theoretical justification for entrapment rests upon constitutional grounds. Various constitutional guarantees have been advanced as a
basis for the defense."6 The major constitutional arguments for entrapment rest
upon due process77 and illegal search and seizure.' It has generally been conceded, however, that the defense of entrapment exists without any substantial
basis in the Constitution."
The majority opinion in Russell hedged somewhat on the constitutional
issue. Although basing the defense on congressional intent, Mr. Justice Relmquist stated:
[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain
a conviction ....

80

But, in retreating to his previous deference to legislative intent, the Justice then
said: "Since the defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may
address itself to the question and adopt any substantive definition of the defense
that it may find desirable."'"
If the defense is ultimately held to rest upon constitutional considerations,
then the flexible control by either the courts or the legislatures will be lost.82 The
Supreme Court, however, by utilizing the various constitutional provisions applicable to the defense, could still maintain some control over entrapment." It
appears, however, that Congress will ultimately shape the outlines of this defense.
V. Procedure
The final controversy concerning entrapment revolves around the respective
functions of the judge and the jury. This issue is also divided along the lines of
the supporters of the innocence as opposed to the objective approach. The
majority in Sorrells held that the question of entrapment should be decided by
75 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916). Releasement power must not be confused with the judge's power to accept or exclude challenged evidence in a criminal proceeding. In the former instance, the accused has admitted at least the technical commission of a
crime. Therefore, the question is not as to the admission of evidence to prove substantive
criminal charges, but rather the power of a judge to release from prosecution altogether an
individual who has committed a crime. In effect, this judicial releasement power is equivalent
to executive pardoning. No such power has ever been recognized to rest in the judicial branch.
76 See, e.g., Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv.
871, 883-84 (1963); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat - The Constitutional
Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALa L.J. 942 (1965).
77 E.g., Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1958).
78 Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat-The Constitutional Status of the
Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 951 (1965).
79 Orfield, supra note 15, at 54.
80 411 U.S. at 431-32.
81 Id. at 433.
82 Comment, supra note 70, at 849.
83 Rotenberg, supra note 64, at 625.
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the jury when considering the defendant's guilt or innocence.8 Mr. Justice
Rehnquist has upheld the role of the jury in the process. Apparently the majority
feel that the protection of one's peers in deciding the question of entrapment
along with that of guilt or innocence overrides the ill effects that prejudicial
evidence may have upon that decision.
The minority, however, felt that the question of entrapment is one for the
judge. This assertion is based upon the conclusion that the defense of entrapment is really distinct from the issue of guilt or innocence of having committed
the instant crime." The minority obviously believed that the issue is one of
police misconduct-one that the judge should determine as to whether the
accused should be tried in his courtroom. Therefore, no issue for the jury is
presented.
VI. Conclusion
Overall, the Supreme Court's decision in Russell has clarified the defense.
The justices in the Russell majority have reaffirmed the innocence approach
thereby directing lower courts to refrain from applying the objective test. They
have indicated that the courts are to apply a two-pronged test to determine if
an entrapment defense will succeed. They have determined that the theoretical
basis of the defense rests upon legislative policy thereby opening the door for
congressional regulation. In addition, they have indicated that the question of
entrapment is one basically for the jury to determine in considering all the facts
of the case.
Major functional problems, however, continue to go unresolved. Where are
the guidelines to aid the lower courts in determining the related question of
predisposition and inducement? What safeguards exist to protect the accused
from a prejudicial jury? What standards of probable cause, if any, must be met
by the government in order to initiate the inducement? These questions must
be now grappled with by the lower courts without sufficient direction from the
Supreme Court. It may ultimately be that these unresolved questions will be
the deciding battleground between the proponents of the differing viewpoints
concerning the defense of entrapment.
Tim Bonner

84
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Note, supra note 22, at 547.
Id.

